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Abstract.  The purpose of the paper is to show how boxing 
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American citizens in the times of the Great Depression of 1929-1933, 
when industrial production was closing. Moreover, while other economic 
activities faced problems, boxing continued to produce money. The 
research analyzes the economic market of professional heavyweight 
boxing, presenting some of the tools that helped promoters produce and 
sell the fight shows to the consumers – like price discrimination and 
cartel agreements, for example, and, thus, helped generating incomes and 
assured money circulation in the economy. 
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1. From amateurism to professionalism 
 
During some fourty years, from the 1880’s to the 1920’s, boxing has risen 
from a „backyard” sport, a circus entertainment (Barnum, 2000) and an illegal 
fight to a social phenomenon that attracted masses of people (Boddy, 2009). 
Tens of thousands of people stormed to bouts, putting stadiums or arenas which 
hosted boxing next to theater and cinema halls, varietés, cabarett and ballrooms 
in the top of the most frequented locations in the 1930’s United States of 
America (Pfeifer, 2005), even with the Great Depression worrying people. Or 
may be it was the Great Depression that attracted the masses to boxing bouts? 
Due to its high social implication, boxing had a major influence on the 
American economy too. Promoters, fighters, national states, as well as private 
businesses and economic agents profited thanks to boxing, which returned to 
them a part of the clients and of the incomes which the Depression had taken 
away. 
The paper aims to present how the economy of professional heavyweight 
boxing functioned during the Great Depression of 1929-1933 and in the 
following years prior to the Second World War. The main focus will be set on 
the US-American market. Interdisciplinarity of sciences is used in order to 
make the topic of the paper more comprehensible. Thus, economic, cultural, 
social and psychologic ideas and theories are combined in the research. In order 
to understand why boxing had such a great success during crisis years and how 
it managed to contribute to the US economy in times when banks and other 
businesses went bankrupt, we have to understand that boxing consumption was 
based on the „panem et circenes” („Bread and games”) principle. The phrase 
„panem et circenes” was used by the Roman poet Juvenal in order to criticise 
the Roman population for its loss of courage and civic spirit. Juvenal mentioned 
that people who once fought for their Roman Empire (even in military wars) 
and for their own status, now were too anxious to enterprise anything anymore 
and hoped for just two things: bread (something to eat) and games (cheap 
entertainment, mostly circuses). The same metaphor can be used to describe the 
US civil society during the Great Depression. The people who in the previous 
years contributed to the development of the US-American business 
environment and economy were now too frightened by the sumber realities and 
perspectives of the crisis. As people had to struggle for their lives and as jobs 
were hard to find, among their sole satisfactions left were attending sporting 
events. And having something to eat on their tables. So, bread and games. With 
games often coming first on the priority list. 
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2. Bread, boxing and private businesses 
 
In the present research, the focus falls on the „games”. The games are the 
heavyweight boxing fights organized in the USA during the years of the Great 
Depression. At a first look, it may be surprising that in times when more and 
more businesses and banks went bankrupt and when unemployment rates grew, 
the boxing market – with its supply and demand for fights – still produced 
valuable fights and huge monetary incomes. The people chose the immediate 
joy and the sense of belonging that a boxing fight induced to them, rather than 
the long-term saving of money. When a boxing fight was at one end of their 
opportunity cost, citizens made chocies thay may be interpreted as bizzare, 
which were not so as they seem to be. Because the economy did not offer a 
promising perspective, people rather invested their few money in attending 
boxing bouts, because they knew they would win immediate incomes: the joy 
of attending a fight and of witnessing something big. Because boxing was big in 
those days, offering many highly valued heavyweighters. For the American 
citizens, buying fight tickets was a rational decision. A decision which 
demonstrates just what a high status boxing had in those days. 
No wonder that not only promoters, but also city councils offered help 
into organizing bouts, because of the economic benefits that fights brought to 
the community. On the 17th of February 1937, Max Schmeling met Heinrich 
Esser – the President of the Nazi Commitee for Foreign Trade – in order to talk 
about the financing which would enable Schmeling to bring James Braddock to 
Germany and fight him there. Esser, through Dr. Schulze-Schlutius, a member 
of the Nazi Party (Kluge, 2004), promised a budget of 350 000 US Dollars 
(Luckey, 2007), about five million US Dollars adjusted in 2009’s value, and 
insisted that the bout should be organized in Berlin, in the newlybuilt 
Olympiastadion. Two were the reasons that made Esser dream of a fight in 
Berlin: on the one hand side, with a capacity of more than 70,000 seats, the 
Olympiastadion would bring high gate incomes from ticket sales. On the other 
one, foreigners which would travel to watch the fight – mainly US-Americans 
who would come to support Braddock, but also Frenchmen and Englishmen – 
would have the ocasion to spend several days in Berlin, but also spend their 
money in the city (Pfeifer, 2005). As air-transport for passengers was almost 
inexistent at that time, the travels between USA and Europe were done through 
ocean liners. The liners didn’t set away from the docks each day, so, whoever 
wanted to catch a line, had to wait some other days. What Esser wanted was 
that these spare days were spent in Berlin, even if the tourists needed to shorten 
their visit in the capital city of Germany in order to make the train trip to 
Hamburg, from where they had to embark on the liner. And, for a mini-vacation Vlad Roşca 
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in Berlin, boxing fans who were coming to watch the fight had to pay their 
hotel rooms and their meals, and they also spent money on visiting tourist 
attractions or on buying souvenirs. So, a boxing bout had the ability to 
contribute to the developpement of the local economy. Unfortunately for Esser, 
Hitler and their National-Socialistic Worker’s Party (NSDAP) – which could 
have enriched its Nazi-propaganda-budget thanks to the spendings of the 
consumers on the Schmeling-Braddock fixture –, Atlantic City in the USA has 
offered 400,000 USD to host the fight and secured itself the right to organize it. 
The same economic principles around a boxing bout were met on the 
other side of the North Atlantic Ocean, just that the USA had a democratic and 
capitalist market, no trace of the German National Socialism. Therewhy, it 
should be no wonder why the most first-class heavyweight bouts during the 
Great Depression were hosted by the USA, eventhough Germany had its own 
valuable boxing market. The sole problem was that Hitler didn’t want 
Schmeling – who, as a world class boxer, was a propaganda tool for the Nazi 
regime – to fight Jews and blacks in Germany, considerably reducing the 
possibilities to generate financial income through the staging of fights. US-
Americans took this opportunity and didn’t let it slip, not at least because it was 
an income source in the tumultuous era of the Depression. Still, Hitler agreed 
with Schmeling fighting whatever boxer outside Germany, and in an interview 
he gave for the Denver Post in April 1936, Schmeling stated that „I expect to 
bring home a couple of houndred thousand dollars” (Margolick, 2006, p. 128). 
Politically, boxing presented a huge interest in Germany (Luckey, 2007, 
Myler, 2005, Stradling, 2009). Having the most powerful role in the national 
economy, the German Nazi State used boxing fights in order to generate 
incomes to the party budget. Contrary to this situation, in the USA, with its free, 
capitalist market, boxing bouts were organized by private agents. The American 
state didn’t directly earn incomes from boxing – although it had its shares of 
interest in the sport –, but the private economic agents were the ones who did. 
Indirectly, however, the national economy was helped by the staging of boxing 
fights, as connex activities, such as the trade with memorabilia branded with the 
names of the fighters, were offered to the boxing fans, thus developing the 
private businesses sector. Margolick described the influence of boxing upon the 
national US-economy by presenting some happenings with socio-economic 
character which were met at the 1936 Louis - Schmeling fight: 
“Harlem’s better hotels were mostly filled, the pawnshops had been 
cleared of field glasses, the liquer stores had upped their stock, the larger 
restaurants had added waiters. According to one purveyour, on fight day 
Harlem ordered ten thousand chickens” (Margolick, 2006, p. 145). The Political Economy of World Heavyweight Boxing during the Great Depression 
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Even during crisis times, a high-interest fight had the power to boost 
various sectors of the private economy, by bringing additional consumers to 
hotels, restaurants, stores, newspapers and many others. The consumers that 
overnighted in hotels did so because they were on a trip especially made to 
attend the fight. The ones who went to restaurants did so because the owners 
installed radios that broadcasted the fights which people wanted to follow and, 
while listening to the voice of Clem McCarthy from NBC reporting about the 
bout in the ring, they also ordered dishes and drinks that raised the incomes of 
the restaurant owners; stores in town were visited by tourists who were there to 
watch the fight, while the newspapers and magazines writing about the boxing 
bout sold enourmous numbers of copies to the “electrified” Americans, who 
were nothing else than addicted to boxing. 
Many economic activities, especially trading, catering, hospitality, 
transports and tourism, were advantaged by the staging of a fight. When it came 
to boxing and to the means of enjoying it (e.g.: by buying newspapers in order 
to get the latest news about the event or by gathering with the friends in a 
restaurant in order to have a meal and to listen to the live broadcasting of the 
bout), the Americans didn’t think too much before giving money away, 
eventhough they lived in crisis times. 
That boxing-madness was described as “Fistinia”. Fistinia (coming from 
“fist”) was the word used to describe the boxing market during the years of the 
Great Depression, and it included offer and demand of and for boxing fights, as 
well as all the other managerial principles which were related to boxing, such as 
athlete branding, bout organization, ticket sales, revenues collection and many 
more. One in all, “Fistinia” was the word used to describe the boxing world. 
 
3. Political economy and heavyweight boxing 
 
In this research, the political economy can be used as a tool to help 
explain the business of boxing from the times of the Great Depression. There 
are at least two principles that political economy is based on:  
a) Community forming - People form communities because they hope 
that by acting toghether in gropus, they can achieve better (living) standards 
than those that they would have reached by living alone (Phelps, 1985). Two 
phenomena occured during the Great Depression. One was that because of 
unemployment, of job instability and of low wages, people tended to become 
more egoistic when it came to finding and administrating an income source. As 
competition between individuals for finding a workplace grew bigger and 
bigger and as spendings on fast moving consumer goods reduced more and 
more, another phenomena, quite bizzare at a first look, appeared: people didn’t Vlad Roşca 
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quit paying for attending mass events in order to save money for something that 
may have been more important, like food, for example. Through mass events 
we understand events where affluences were high – not just once, but 
succesively, all over the interbellic years –, such as boxing fights, baseball 
games or jazz concerts. An influence that persisted from the Roaring Twenties 
was the pursuit of happiness (Fitzgerald, 1998). Boxing fights offered happiness 
to the spectators, who were glad to be part of the community of fans visiting the 
events. 
b) Reward Structures - The political economy also studies the „reward 
structures that society can [...] choose among” (Phelps, 1985, p. 4). A boxing 
fight was a reward for its spectators, because it satisfied the citizens’ wants of 
entertainment, communion and joy. Such needs were high in times when 
insecurity, starvation and poverty characterized the society (Edsforth, 2000, 
Parker, 2002, Watkins, 2000). People chose to attend fights even if it ment to 
spend their last dollars, because boxing events were an opportunity to break out 
of the daily worries. 
After studying these two principles of political economy, a question 
arises: Did the boxing consumers make a good choice when deciding to buy 
fight tickets? The economic theory states that people, having limited ressources 
– as was the case during the Great Depression –, rationally decide upon how to 
use the ressources in order to cover their needs. Among others, what people in 
America’s 1930’s needed was entertainment, as it was a way to relax and to 
forget the daily worries. Because people were consciuous about their desire to 
attend a boxing fight in the moment they bought a ticket – otherwise, they 
wouldn’t have bought it anymore –, we can say that their decision was rational. 
Consumers quit buying another economic good or service in order to buy 
themselves a night out at boxing. But, did consumers make good choices? 
Many consumers spent their last money on fights and on connex activities, such 
as betting. This shows what an appeal boxing had in the 1930’s, but also that 
the decisions of boxing fans were, often, emotionally driven. When deciding to 
buy boxing tickets, many acted impulsive. Because boxing was an institution of 
the American interbellic society, many people spent their savings or their last 
dimes on buying fight tickets and placing bets.  
The economy is a result of human behaviour (Beardshaw, 1992, Begg et 
al., 2005, Begg, Ward, 2003). Because the humans are the ones who make 
economy exist, there is a strong bond between economy, society and culture. As 
a matter of fact, economy is a social science, with a complex evolutive system 
(Marinescu, 2004). Boxing, as part of the 1930’s society, was therefore 
influenced by economy. Moreover, because boxing was a trend in those years, a 
social phenomenon that would nowadays be described as “hollywoodian”, the The Political Economy of World Heavyweight Boxing during the Great Depression 
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ring-sport was a driver of economy. Of a “dead” economy. What hard goods 
producers and many sorts of enterprises couldn’t do, boxing did: it sold to the 
people and it guaranteed money circulation. It helped an economy finding itself 
in crisis produce money and it gave hope to the people. 
Economy helps the human adapt to the natural and social environment he 
is living in. Professional boxing had its own economic market through which it 
helped people adapt to their society. Boxing fights were produced by athletes 
and their staff, who acted as production factors, whereas the spectators – who 
were the consumers – paid a ticket and recieved instead the product: the boxing 
bout. Consumers bought themselves the right to watch a fight. In the meantime, 
the money the spectators paid for the tickets entered the boxing market and 
boosted the developpement of “Fistinia”, which emerged to a private services 
sector. 
 
4. The emmergence of boxing to a social institution 
 
The immediate post-war era (1919-1929) was flourishing for the US 
society. The Roaring Twenties were times of joy, hope and success (Idema, 1990). 
Consumers spent more and more, permitting corporations to boost their profits. 
Thanks to the higher profits, entrepreneurs were able to offer higher wages, and the 
welfare of the employees improved. Also, unemployment rates diminished, as new 
businesses were opened. The Share Market also climbed, but the growth was faster 
than the implementation of control instruments, and as a result, the New York 
Stock Exchange crashed in 1929. But, until 1929, the third decade of the century 
was a great period for the US economy. And for boxing. 
The needs met by the Army in the First World War developed the 
industrial capacity of the USA and improved the states’ economies, which 
rapidly grew in the first postbelic years. During 1922 and 1923, the US 
economy stabilizes, with the country leading the world in what concerns 
technology (Mureşan, Mureşan, 2003). Because the technical capacity 
improved, more goods were produced in less time and at lower costs, the 
classical example being Henry Ford’s assembly line (Ford, 2008), which, by 
1931, was used by other companies – such as Chevrolet – as well (Lewis, 
1976). More goods were also sold, and the financial disponibilities of the 
private economic agents and of the country grew. A state of welfare was 
achieved. The private and public investments in all the fields of the society, 
including investments in professional boxing, prospered. 
The leading industry in the 1920’s USA was the automotive one. In 
Detroit, cars were produced in masses and sold at lower prices than ever before, 
thanks to the scale economies (Babson, 1986, Poremba, 2005, Woodford, 2001). Vlad Roşca 
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The car becomes an affordable good, and citizens begin to buy it more and 
more. During the 1920’s, the price of a Ford was 290 US-Dollars (American 
Cultural History, 1920-1929, http://kclibrary.lonestar.edu/ decade20.html), no 
more than about 3,700 US-Dollars in 2009’s value. Urban transportation 
becomes easyer and an effect is that people can now faster reach the fighting 
venue, by driving their cars. Thus, attendances at boxing bouts grow, and so do 
the gate incomes too. The additional income brought by the evolution of 
technology is reinvested into boxing, developing the sport and its economic 
market. No wonder that the first million dollar gate boxing event ever witnessed 
occured in 1921. Then, the Dempsey-Carpentier fight in Jersey City produced 
$1,6 million from ticket sales. Between 1921 and 1929, 1,488,900 spectators 
watched boxing fights around New York alone, contributing with $ 14,247,313 
(about $ 176,805,295 in 2009’s value) to the professional boxing market (Fight 
Toys, 2010). Now that their wages were higher, citizens afforded to attend 
boxing fights more and more. The contribution of the fans, among with the 
economic, social and technical developments, improved the boxing market in 
such a way that, when the Great Depression came, boxing already had a 
consolidated position, from which it could not be beaten very easy. The 
tradition that boxing created in the first thirty years of the twentieth century 
(also thanks to the growth of investments made after the First World War) 
helped the fist sport to easier get out of the Great Depression. As a matter of 
fact, due to the “panem et circenes” principle, the economy of boxing did not 
suffer too much during the depression. 
On October 29
th, 1929, after severe fluctuations of trade (Robbins, 
Weidenbaum, 2009) the stock prices at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
drastically fall, and the NYSE crashes (Streissguth, 2007). The savers withdraw 
their savings from the banks. The banks cannot cope with the amount of 
withdrawals and many of them go bankrupt. Next to the big banks, the USA had a 
complex network of small banks (Mureşan, Mureşan, 2003), which helped the 
local communities. Most of the citizens collaborated with their “street corner” 
bank. The crash of the small banks drove the ordinary citizens into scarcity. As fast 
as the incomes of the households and the individual purchase power grew after the 
first World War, as fast they declined after the “Black Thursday”. In 1931, the 
USA count 2,298 bank bankruptcies, as compared to 642 in the first year of 
depression, 1929 (Mureşan, Mureşan, 2003). 
However, the boxing economy did not suffer from the Great Depression 
as much as other economies. And under no circumstances did it enter 
bankruptcy, as the banking did. Next to its consolidated position and to the 
“panem et circenes” principle that were already discussed in the paper, the 
boxing world was saved by its own form of cartel agreements. The Political Economy of World Heavyweight Boxing during the Great Depression 
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5. Cartel agreements on the boxing market 
 
During 1929 and 1933 – and, as a consequence, also in the rest of the 
years prior to the Second World War – an industrial production crisis hit many 
sectors of the American economy. But it did not hit the boxing economy. 
Excepting punching in the ring, many boxers hardly knew anything else what to 
do. Boxing was their job, and if they wouldn’t have boxed, they would have 
struggeled in life. Paradoxically again, this limited qualification to a sole piece 
of knowledge (knowing how to fight) saved the boxers and their sport. 
Other American industries and businesses layed a seal on their doors 
during the Great Depression. Still, former employees, now unemployed, had a 
hope left: professional reconversion. The hope of reconversion made the 
citizens think that there may be a chance, even if it was small, to find another 
job. As a consequence, employees didn’t struggle to keep their current job, and 
this was fatal to them. Because of the lack of citizen involvment into the 
community that Juvenal satirized through the „panem et circenes” metaphor as 
early as in the year 100 AD, the power and the influence of the labor unions 
was drastically reduced. Labor unions couldn’t negotiate profitable agreements 
for their members and neither the employers didn’t try to hard to help their 
employees, as they thought that employees would somehow find a new job and 
survive. 
This passivity wasn’t to be found in boxing. Boxers knew that if Fistinia 
was going to crash as the NYSE did, they wouldn’t have had much left to do 
and they would have hardly made some money in order to live. Promoters were 
also aware of that. James Braddock’s case speaks for itself, being one of the 
most remarcable stories of world’s sport. Braddock was born June 8, 1905, in 
Hell’s Kitchen, New York’s district of Irish immigrants (Schaap, 2005). At the 
age of 21, Braddock turned pro, and his fulminant career debut was highly 
promising: 44 wins and just two losses in three years. However, in 1928, 
Braddock lost a championship fight to Tommy Loughran and entered in a 
mental state of depression. Braddock couldn’t return to his winning series and 
became a mediocre boxer. Because his family suffered of poverty during the 
Great Depression, Braddock gave up boxing and began working on the docks, 
as a longshoreman. Because he had just few business practice, as a child, and no 
higher qualification, the poor paid job in the docks was among the few 
Braddock could do in order to earn some money and save his family. 
Eventually, due to the longshoreman work, Braddock strengthened his left arm. 
This physical evolution and an improved state of mind made Braddock return 
into the boxing ring. After only one year from his comback, Braddock defeated 
Max Baer and became heavyweight champion of the world. But, if he wouldn’t Vlad Roşca 
 
136 
have had boxing, Braddock wouldn’t have found too lucrative jobs. Maybe just 
some ones like errand boy or courrier boy for the Western Union, jobs he had 
done in his youth. Other US citizens weren’t even so lucky as Braddock had 
been. 
The sumber perspective of loosing the boxing and of entering 
unemployment made boxers and promoters unite and work together in order to 
save their income source. The cartel agreements helped them in their actions. 
Forming a closed circle, promoters aided eachother, by offering boxers who to 
produce fights, which were to be sold to consumers who wanted to attend them. 
Thus, the existence of boxing events was granted, and parts of the incomes were 
used for offering purses to the boxers. 
Cartels are formed when two or more economic agents come to an 
agreement. Such was the case in the boxing economy of the 1920’s and 1930’s. 
Promoters acted in unison, agreeing about how and when to stage the fights, 
which boxer to meet whichother boxer, what purses to offer for the fighters, at 
which venue to organize the fight or what admission fees to set. And, last but 
not least, how high would be their own comissions: what percentage of the fight 
incomes would remain to them, the promoters. Because boxing is also an 
economy, setting the percentages each one has to receive is one of the main 
characteristics of sharing a market. If prior to the First World War, a promoter 
managed few or even just one boxer, beginning with the 1920’s, promoters 
(also known as agents) build themselves portfolios of more boxers, for whom 
they agree to stage fights, making “boxing promotion an art form”, which was 
“carefully orchestrated […] by slick press-agentry” (Sammonds, 1990). 
Because the collaboration between them becomes more powerful, promoters 
manage to limit the number of agents around the boxing world and to enclose 
the circle of the boxing market, which becomes more concentrated, more 
professionalized and more lucrative. More money is being made, and it 
circulates between the „pockets” of the promoters. For the promoters, who 
acted as the cartels, the market of professional heavyweight boxing was 
becoming an oligopoly market, controlled by a few economic agents who had 
high financial and influential power, and who could easily anticipate the other’s 
thoughts and decisions. Eventhough the boxing market had a private charcater, 
the gross of the investments being done by nonstatal agents, the United States 
of America had all the interest that the sport developped properly. Indirectly, 
the States also had something to win thanks to boxing. First of all, there were 
the incomes and the taxes that had to be paid to the government when 
organizing an event. Second, the private sector of the economy was boosted by 
a fight. As already mentioned, boxing fans spent money around a fight, buying, 
next to the tickets, various connex goods or services, like for example food, The Political Economy of World Heavyweight Boxing during the Great Depression 
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drinks, newspapers, transport services or hotel rooms. When a fight was staged, 
bars, restaurants, gas stations, hotels, transport operators like taxi drivers or the 
railway system, theater halls that presented filmed images of the fights, 
ballrooms where partys were started after the fights, as well as newspapers and 
magazines, all had to win thanks to the connex spendings of the boxing fans. 
 
6. The demand for fight tickets during the Great Depression 
 
To better understand the demand of tickets, it is useful to know how the 
organization of bouts took place. Each boxer had a promoter, which acted as his 
manager/agent. The promoter was in charge of finding partners, organizing the 
fights and managing all issues that concerned the finances of the fights: How 
much would a bout cost, what were the taxes and what would be the purse of 
the fighter? 
To give just a single example, after setting foot in the boxing industry, 
Mike Jacobs founded the Twentieth Century Boxing Club in 1933. It was a 
company that organized events, and with the help of his relations in the boxing 
world and of the fighters that Jacobs managed – among them Joe Louis – the 
Twentieth Century Boxing Club emerged into a highly lucrative company and 
became a rival for the Madison Square Garden, an event organizer which had 
the advantage of owning the well-known sports arena in New York. 
The demand represents the given quantity of a product a consumer wants 
to buy at a given maximum price. In the case of the 1930’s heavyweight 
boxing, the core product a promoter offered was the entry ticket. Through the 
ticket, the promoter was selling the boxing show on the canvas. The ticket was 
the proof that the consumer bought the right to watch the fight. 
The demand law helps demonstrate the behaviour of the boxing spectator 
during the Great Depression, by using two economic tools: demanded quantity 
and the price of the good. In general, if the price of the good reduces, the 
demanded quantity increases, and vice-versa. Next, the paper will concentrate 
upon the reasons which led to the mass consumption of boxing during the Great 
Depression. 
Althogh times were hard, the tickets for boxing bouts, as well as food, 
clothing or electronics, weren’t so expensive as one might think. In fact, all 
those products were cheap, but for those who had a job and who could afford 
them. For the employed Americans, buying themselves a night out at boxing 
was an extra they could afford next to the daily basic products. For example, a 
lawyer or a doctor earning about $50 a month (that is about 630$ in 2009’s 
value), afforded to buy a $5-$7 (about $70-$100 in 2000’s value) ticket at a 
bout. And this wasn’t even the cheapest type of ticket. Not ticket prices were Vlad Roşca 
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high, but the purchase power was low. Many people didn’t have the money to 
spend on fights. They spent their dollars on what was really necessary and 
saved the rest. Still, venues were mostly sold-out at heavyweight fights, with 
people from all the social categories attending (Young, Young, 2007). The 
following economic principles permitted mass-attending to occur even during 
crisis times: 
 
1) Price discrimination: Nellis and Parker define price discrimination as 
“the practice of charging different prices for various units of a single product or 
service when the price differences are not justified by differences in 
production/supply costs” (2006, p. 269). So, in boxing, price differentiation 
means to charge different prices for the same fight. The practicing of price 
discrimination assured sold-out venues.  
At a lower price, the demanded quantity (QD) generally grows. Promoters 
used price discrimination in order to have the possibility to offer low prices, 
and, thus, to increase the quantity of spectators at fights. The ticket values of 
the Louis-Schmeling fight in 1938 were $5,75 and $30. The expensive tickets 
had a low demand, because they were affordable only to people with a decent 
income or to snobs. Even though demand for the $30 tickets was lower than the 
one for $5,75 tickets, promoters made profits thanks to the higher prices of the 
expensive tickets. The low priced tickets had a high demand, being affordable 
to the majority of the US-American society. Promoters made profits also in this 
case, thanks to the quantity of sold tickets. 
Managers and promoters were the ones who had to be praised for assuring 
sold-out stadiums. As organizers of the bouts, they had a personal interest to 
sell as many tickets as possible, because they would keep a share of the 
revenues. Their habit was to organize fights in big venues, which could host 
more than 80,000 people, such as the Yankees Stadium in New York or the 
Soldier’s Field in Chicago. The architecture of such arenas permitted price 
discrimination. The boxing ring was set in the center of the stadium. Thus, the 
best visibility for spectators was offered by the rows next to the ring and some 
of the rows further up. As distance to the ring grew, visibility quality 
diminished, with the lowest visibility at the far away seats. Thanks to this 
architecture, promoters could sell the fight “at different prices to different 
costumer groups for various reasons” (Nellis, Parker, 2006, p. 268). Generally, 
the seats which offered best visibility were bought by wealthy, employed 
people, while the seats with low visibility were the offer promoters made to the 
unemployed or to the people with low wages. Prices were direct proportional to 
visibility. The better the view, the higher the price. Even if they couldn’t see 
well, spectator bought back-rows tickets because those tickets offered the The Political Economy of World Heavyweight Boxing during the Great Depression 
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possibility to be part of a social event and to feel the atmosphere, all at an 
affordable price. High incomes from the sell of expensive tickets permitted the 
organizers to lower the ticket prices for other seats in the arena, thus to offer 
correct prices for each category of consumers. The snobs had “their” expensive 
prices, the wealthy middle-class had expensive but affordable prices, while the 
unemployed and the poor had the low prices. The preoccupation of promoters 
to make fights affordable to poor people was one of the factors that contributed 
to boxing’s success in the 1930’s. Snobs were the “big spenders” and because 
they paid so much for a ticket, they guaranteed a significant part of the gate 
revenue. But, as significant as that was also the contribution of the poor, who 
were the “mass spenders”. Quantitatively, poor spectators overnumbered the 
wealthy and the snobs at a fight. Snobs bought few tickets for much money, 
while poor bought many tickets for few money. Given the quantity of tickets 
they purchased, poor also guaranteed a significant part of the gate revenues. 
For the Schmeling-Gora fight in 1931, prices varied from $1 (about $14 
in 2009’s value) at the gallery, $2 ($28 in 2009) at the balcony, up to $5 ($70 in 
2009) at the ringside. This was a minor discrimination, as the prices varied in a 
margin of four dollars (between $1 and $5), but there have been bouts in the 
1930’s where tickets started from $2 and went up to $30 ($450 in 2009) or $40 
($600 in 2009). 
 
2) Snobbism: According to the theory of Veblen, also known as the 
snobbism paradox, consumers who want to show off their status in the society 
buy expensive goods or goods whose prices increase and aren’t affordable to 
everyone (Veblen, 2009). By doing so, the snobs want to demonstrate their 
purchase power and their greatness derived from it in front of the world. In 
boxing, the snobs usually buy tickets in the rows next to the ring, the most 
expensive ones The expenditures of the snobs assured a significant part of the 
gate revenues at the fights of the Great Depression Era. Prominent names of the 
1930’s American society, such as New York’s Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, 
blues interpret Duke Ellington, or baseball player Babe Ruth were regular 
spectators at heavyweight bouts in New York City. Eleanor Roosevelt, 
President Roosevelt’s wife, bought three tickets at the Louis-Carnera fight in 
1935, but never showed up (Margolick, 2006). 
 
3) Few substitutes: Boxing was a product with few substitutes in the 
1930’s, other offers with similar entertainment characteristics – relaxation, 
socialization, joy, feeling of being part of a community – being theaters, 
ballrooms or cinemas. The availability of substitute goods influenced the 
demand for fight tickets. Generally, if the price of a good with many substitutes Vlad Roşca 
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increases, the demanded quantity of that good will diminish, as the consumer 
will turn to the substitutes and choose the particular good which offers him the 
best quality-quantity-price-relationship. For goods with few substitutes – such 
as boxing during the Great Depression – a modification of the price won’t lead 
to a massive loss of consumers. Because there aren’t any or just few substitutes, 
consumers will continue to buy the product, whatever the price. 
 
4) Inferior good: During the 1930’s boxing was an inferior good, this 
characteristic being one of the factors that guaranteed high attendance. Normal 
goods are the goods for which the demand modifies in the same way as the 
income: if the income increases, the demand also increases. The inferior goods, 
although, are the goods for which the demand modifies in a contrary way than the 
income: for example, if the income diminishes, the demand continues to be the 
same or even increases. The tendency during the Great Depression was that the 
income of households and of individuals lowered. The theory of the income effect 
states that, if the income diminishes, consumers will reduce spending and buy a 
lower quantity of the good. It didn’t happen with boxing. Even if their incomes 
dropped during 1929 and the 1930’s, the Americans continued to storm out in 
masses at fights and to fill out the hosting venues. Moreover, they gambled a lot. 
 
5) Rare, “enourmous” events: Two of the most important characteristics 
of heavyweight boxing were the rarity and the enormity of fights. Bouts 
between two heavyweighters were the supreme shows a sports fan could think 
about. Although, for example, Joe Louis fought sometimes even more then ten 
times a year, his most bouts were against low-rated pugilists, many fights being 
organized as training for the important bouts. For a boxer, fights against rival 
boxers of at least the same quality were rare: one, two, or maybe three a year. 
When such “enormous” fights were set to find place, the society and the mass-
media were wired up to them months before the first punch. Heavyweight bouts 
had an aura of greatness, and people afforded to save money in order to buy a 
ticket, because they knew something like that wouldn’t come up again too soon. 
And, putting away some money once a year for feeling good wasn’t that hard 
even in crisis times. 
So, consumers invested into boxing, by buying tickets. This paper tried to 
demonstrate that even during times of economic crisis, sporting events can be 
produced and sold to the public. Each type of sport has its own economy and its 
own market, needing production factors in order to exist. Next to baseball, it 
was the most influential sport in the US-American society of the 1930’s. 
Boxing also was among the few social activities of those years that managed to 
make money circulate into the economy. The Political Economy of World Heavyweight Boxing during the Great Depression 
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7. Conclusions and further research 
 
Back in the 1930’s, as well as in our days, spectator sports were a Fast 
Moving Consumer Experience (FMCE). In order to sell the fights, promoters 
produced an aura of unique experience for the boxing bouts. The main selling 
preposition of a boxing fight was the unique experience of joy and happiness it 
offered to the spectators. Spectators who, due to the crisis, couldn’t find joy in 
many other places. The search of joy was a positive consequence of the Roaring 
Twenties and one of the factors that made boxing exist and assure money 
circulation during the Great Depression and the rest of the years prior to the 
Second World War. One other factor presented in the research was the ability of 
promoters to understand and to use five economic theories/laws: the price 
discrimination theory, the Veblen Theory, the law of goods with few 
substitutes, the theory of inferior goods and the principle or rare events. Maybe 
the most powerful tool used by promoters was price discrimination. And, last 
but not least, another factor of boxing’s success during the Depression was the 
existence of cartel agreements between the promoters. 
The research made an attempt to explain how the economy of 
professional heavyweight boxing succesfully functioned during the Great 
Depression. Further research may concentrate on the financial implications of 
boxing fights organized during the Great Depression. A research taking an 
inside look into the promoter’s world, presenting how boxing agents organized 
fights and managed the boxing economy, would also be interesting. This 
research concentrated on a period in history, but further research can be done 
about the economy of boxing in general. Even a parallel comparison between 
the economy of boxing during the times of the Depression and the ones of the 
following decades would be interesting. 
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